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“[D]eveloping countries must be able to reap the benefits of international
trade.” - Anna Lindh, former Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Towards Stability in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo – The Dodd-Frank Act’s Strengths and
Weaknesses
Rebecca N. Sells*
I. INTRODUCTION
When people hear the Democratic Republic of the Congo (herein Congo
or DRC), unsurprisingly images of the “heart of darkness,” poverty, and
despair arise. The Congo has been in a state of conflict even before gaining
independence. Although the international war involving rebel groups and
various African militias, which killed millions starting in 1996, was thought
to be the height of Congo’s despair, the eastern part of the country
continues to suffer from ongoing conflicts with rebel leaders controlling the
region and using violent tactics, such as rape, to maintain power. Fueling
the war is the growing need for precious minerals located in the region.
International response to the crisis has come in many forms, including
traditional aid. Yet more recently, foreign nations, including the United
States, have looked at how legislation can help stop the violence.
Unfortunately, the proposed legislation often has unforeseen or unintended
consequences that arguably do more harm than good.
I will argue this is the case for the Dodd-Frank Act, Section 1502, which
took effect in 2013.1 The main summary of the legislation is as follows:
*
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[I]ssuers with conflict minerals that are necessary to the
functionality or production of a product manufactured by such
person to disclose annually whether any of those minerals
originated in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or an
adjoining country. If an issuer’s conflict minerals originated in
those countries, Section 13(p) requires the issuer to submit a report
to the Commission that includes a description of the measures it
took to exercise due diligence on the conflict minerals’ source and
chain of custody.2
More simply, the Act requires US companies to report if their products
contain “conflict minerals”3 obtained from the DRC or other neighboring
countries.4 If the products do contain conflict minerals, the company must
report what steps were taken to ensure that the minerals were not obtained
via means that continue the conflict in the DRC. 5 There are no
repercussions if a company uses conflict minerals—the hope is that the
consumers will be diligent and avoid these products.6
Although those behind the Dodd-Frank Act had good intentions, the
actual implications of the legislation have been overwhelmingly negative.7
Not only has the legislation been made extremely weak due to lobbyists and
private interests, but it also has already had harmful effects on the

provided guidance and encouragement throughout this writing process, and especially
thank the Seattle Journal for Social Justice for their hard work and assistance.
1
Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56274-01 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 240 and 249b).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Laura Seay, What’s Wrong with Dodd-Frank 1502? Conflict Minerals, Civilian
Livelihoods, and the Unintended Consequences of Western Advocacy 13 (Center for
Global Development, Working Paper No. 284, Jan. 2012), available at
http://www.cgdev.org/files/1425843_file_Seay_Dodd_Frank_FINAL
(arguing
one
plausible theory as Kabila’s intention to sway voters in the upcoming election).
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Congolese people. 8 By examining the legislation, its impact, and its
potential alternatives, this paper will aim to combine legal analysis with a
comprehensive discussion on what is necessary to stabilize the region.
While others have discussed which American laws should change to
address the conflict, this article will argue that such reporting measures are
too weak, do not address the root problems, and, therefore, are ineffective in
curing the violence in the DRC. Instead, I will present a variety of
considerations that the United States and other nations should explore in
order to create a legitimate, stable system of mineral exports while
addressing the root problems fueling the crisis.
In order to present a comprehensive understanding of the factors
contributing to the violence in the DRC, I will begin with a brief history of
the region. Following this will be a discussion on the conflict minerals
themselves, including what minerals are mined, what they are used for, and
how they are extracted and exported to become part of a finished product.
With the background material covered, I will then move on to what forms
of aid have been given, what types of legislation have been enacted to
address the issues within the DRC, and why they have or have not worked.
This leads to a discussion of the Dodd-Frank Act, including how it
originated and the changes it has gone through to gain the support necessary
to enact the legislation. A critical lens will be used to examine the realistic
consequences and benefits of the legislation in the DRC and discuss the
weaknesses within the text that, much due to lobbyists, promise little
liability for corporations absconding from the reporting process. Lastly, a
prescriptive element will be offered, whereby I present a variety of
considerations that must be explored in developing a plan to stabilize the
region and end the violence that has killed so many.

8

Seay, supra note 7, at 15.
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II. HISTORY OF THE DRC
Recorded history of the territory making up the DRC spans back
thousands of years, but for purposes of this paper only the history from
colonization forward will be discussed. The first recorded discovery of the
DRC by Europeans was in 1482 when a Portuguese explorer, Diogo Cao,
discovered the region and made relations with a local king.9 Through the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Congolese welcomed the European
missionaries and traders.10
In the mid-1800s, Belgium’s King Leopold II went about planning how
he could gain control of the region and plunder its resources for his personal
wealth.11 Leopold obtained more than 400 signed treatises with Congolese
leaders and was able to have the DRC allocated to him during the 1884
Berlin Conference, which carved the continent into pieces for the European
nations. 12 Leopold subsequently established the Congo Free State and
named himself as Head of State. 13 Over the next quarter of a century,
Leopold used brutal tactics to obtain resources and export them to Europe.
It is estimated that 13 million Congolese were killed or worked to their
death under Leopold’s reign, while millions of others suffered physical
deformities due to the tactics used to control the people and obtain
resources.14

9

SCOTT F. BOBB, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE
CONGO (Zaire) 2 (Scarecrow Press 1999).
10
Id. at 3.
11
Id.
12
Id. For more information on the Berlin Conference see GEORGE MARTELLI, LEOPOLD
TO LUMUMBA: A HISTORY OF THE BELGIAN CONGO 1877-1960, 97–107 (1962).
13
BOBB, supra note 9, at 4.
14
Michela Wrong, Belgium Confronts Its Heart of Darkness, THE INDEPENDENT (Feb.
23, 2005), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/belgium-confronts-itsheart-of-darkness-6151923.html. Examples of the brutality include the chopping off of
hands if the rubber quota was not met. With the constant plundering of the land, the
resources sought became scarcer and Leopold’s tactics became more brutal. See ADAM
HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR, AND HEROISM IN
COLONIAL AFRICA (1999).
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Although many of the atrocities were shielded from Europeans, reports of
the conditions did escape in the early part of the new century and resulted in
Belgium taking control over the Congo in 1908, therein forming the
Belgium Congo. 15 In 1959, riots erupted in the Congo amidst Africa’s
uprising against colonial control. 16 Belgium held on until June 30, 1960,
when it handed over control to the Congolese.17
Patrice Lumumba became the first prime minister of the newly formed
state but was assassinated in 1961.18 Power struggles for the prime minister
position occurred until 1965 when Joseph Mobutu seized power.19 Mobutu
would rule for a long time with little success—he named the country Zaire
and attempted to bring in foreign investments that ultimately failed.20
The DRC made international headlines during the Rwandan Genocide in
1994 when the Tutsi ethnic minority sought refuge across the DRC border.21
After several years, most of the Tutsis returned back to Rwanda, while
approximately 100,000 stayed in the DRC and aligned with DRC Tutsis.22
Unhappy with Mobutu’s rule, the Tutsis gained support from neighboring
countries and advanced on Kinshasa, the capital city.23 Through a series of
political maneuvers Mobutu was ridded of his power in 1997 and was

15

BOBB, supra note 9, at 4.
Id. at 5.
17
Id. at 6.
18
Id. at 6–7. The assassination is believed to have been supported by both the United
States and Belgium. Lumumba, in trying to stabilize the region, sought help from outside
countries, and when he was refused help by the United States, he contacted the Soviet
Union. In the height of the Cold War, the United States feared the country would align
with the Soviets, therein justifying the assassination. Georges Nzongola Ntalaja, Partice
Lumumba: The Most Important Assassination of the 20th Century, THE GUARDIAN (Jan.
17, 2011, 5:39 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/201
1/jan/17/patrice-lumumba-50th-anniversary-assassination.
19
BOBB, supra note 9, at 8.
20
Id. at 8–13.
21
Id. at 17.
22
Id. at 18.
23
Id. at 17–18.
16
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replaced with Laurent Kabila, who subsequently renamed Zaire the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.24
Although reports of violence and mass murders by the Tutsis occurred
prior to Kabila’s reign, violence continued to expand after Kabila was
accused of corruption for appointing his staff as members of the
government.25 Anti-Kabila rebel groups were formed, supported by Rwanda,
Uganda, and Burundi. 26 Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia sent troops to
counter the rebels and support Kabila. 27 War broke out. In 1999 it was
reported that 20 armed rebel groups were active in the DRC with an
estimated 5.4 million Congolese dying between 1998 and 2008 as a result of
the war.28
In 2001, while the war was raging, a bodyguard assassinated Kabila.29
Kabila’s son, Joseph Kabila, subsequently took power.30 Shortly thereafter,
the young Kabila attempted to broker a peace agreement, obtaining
promises from both the Rwandan and Ugandan governments stating that
they would withdraw their troops from the DRC. 31 Unfortunately, the

24

Id. at 18.
Id. at 19–20.
26
Id. at 20.
27
Id.
28
This is a highly disputed figure. The International Rescue Committee published its
number of 5.4 million dying from “war-related causes.” Special Report: Congo,
INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE http://www.rescue.org/special-reports/specialreport-congo-y. But other agencies have criticized this number, saying that many of the
deaths would have occurred without the war due to common illness and disease. See DR
Congo War Deaths ‘Exaggerated’, BBC (Jan. 20, 2010, 6:51 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8471147.stm.
29
MICHAEL NEST, FRANCOIS GRINGNON & EMIZET KISANGANI, THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF CONGO: ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF WAR AND PEACE 27 (2005).
30
Id.
31
Id. Although they did go about pulling back troops, both Uganda and Rwanda were
found via the UN to delay their withdrawal in an attempt to obtain minerals. Id.
25
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prospect of peace did not last long—by 2004 Rwandan rebels were
wreaking havoc in the East.32
To this day, many rebel groups continue to control parts of the DRC.33
Although UN Peacekeepers and other aid groups have been in the DRC for
many years attempting to calm the situation and provide support for
innocent civilians, the violence continues to take its toll.34 It is estimated
that 45,000 Congolese die every month, mostly from lack of food,
preventable illness, and other consequences of war. 35 Many of the
Congolese who are not killed by the conflict are subjected to heinous crimes,
32

See Back to the Brink in the Congo, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (Dec. 17, 2004),
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/B021-back-to-thebrink-in-the-congo.aspx.
33
Jeffery Gettleman, Congo Slips into Chaos Again as Rebels Gain, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/26/world/africa/as-rebels-gain-congo-againslips-into-chaos.html?_r=0. In November 2012, the eastern city of Goma was taken by
rebels. Goma is the epicenter for the aid industry in the east. I visited Goma in July 2010,
and was amazed to see the expansive aid network, complete with lavish housing
developments for aid workers and upscale restaurants. Id. It is not only rebel groups that
control the trade and cause violence in the DRC. The Congolese army is corrupt and
often perpetrates crimes. The problem has been made worse by the integration of rebel
groups into the army. Because of the serious violations, the UN had to sever their
relationship with the army. This problem raises the complex issue of how to ensure
civilian safety and secure the supply chain if those hired to protect the system are actually
endangering it. Congo Jeffery Gettlemen, Army Helps Rebels Get Arms, U.N. Finds N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 25, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/25/world/africa/25congo.html?_
r=0.
34
Why international aid has been unable to end the violence in the DRC is a complex
topic, worthy of its own article. Several of the biggest factors include the type of war
being fought by the rebel groups, including the use of “bush” tactics whereby they move
around the region terrorizing civilians and destroying infrastructure as they go. Much of
the aid industry is focused on providing basic necessities to civilians, including food and
healthcare and is not looking at the long-term stability of the region. For an in-depth
discussion on ways in which international support fails to successfully aid Africa, see
DAMBISA MOYO, DEAD AID: WHY AID IS NOT WORKING AND HOW THERE IS A BETTER
WAY (2010). It should be acknowledged here that I in no way intend to discredit those
agencies providing short-term aid to the region; I simply want to acknowledge that there
is a difference between aid agencies aimed at providing short-term relief, and those
focusing on long-term stability.
35
Roots of the Crisis - Congo, ENOUGH,http://www.enoughproject.org/conflict_areas
/eastern_congo/roots-crisis (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).
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including rape and other forms of sexual assault. 36 Rebel groups, some
backed by neighboring countries, show no intent of ending the conflict. 37
While financial gain from the precious minerals is one reason for the
violence, many argue the mineral trade is a symptom of the crisis and not a
cause.38 This argument is based on the fact that not all mines are points of
controversy; many mines are operated peacefully.39 That the mineral trade
is not the sole cause of the violence raises the point that even if the trade
can be made secure and stable, it will not stop the violence within the DRC.
Therefore, other issues causing the violence must be addressed in creating
an effective response.
The issue of land rights is also a reason for the violence and is a common
problem within Africa as a whole. Land is disputed because “customary,
informal and statutory land-tenure systems ‘overlap’ geographically, in the
sense that a certain parcel of land might be claimed by different actors
under different systems.”40 The land disputes are fought fervently because,

36

Jeffery Gettleman, Congo Study Suggest a Higher Rate of Rape in Congo, N.Y. TIMES
(May 11, 2011),http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/12/world/africa/12congo.html. The
Eastern part of the DRC is thought to have the highest rate of rape in the world. Id.
Estimates put the number of rapes at 2 million, with a rape said to occur every minute. Id.
Rape is used as a weapon of war to instill fear and gain control of civilians by rebels. Id.
Many of the crimes against civilians are perpetrated by the Congolese army, who, while
under the control of the government, are notorious for unethical and violent behavior,
corruption, and a failure to follow orders. Id.
37
The past five years in the DRC have been marked by complex power struggles and
attempts at peace negotiations with intervening foreign aid groups. See Democratic
Republic of Congo, BBC, (Feb 5, 2013, 12:48 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldafrica-13286306.
38
George Fominyen, Mineral Certification: The Path to End Congo’s Violence?,
ALERTNET (May 6, 2011 6:56 PM), http://m.trust.org/alertnet/news/mineral-certificationthe-path-to-end-congos-violence/.
39
Id.
40
Chris Huggins, Land, Power and Identity, Roots of Violent Conflict in DRC, 5 (INT’L
ALERT, Nov. 2010) available at http://www.internationalalert.org/sites/default/files/pub
lications/201011LandPowerIdentity.pdf.
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while land is essential for livelihood, “it is also bound up very strongly with
issues of ‘identity and power.’”41
Ethnic tension is another reason for the violence.42 While ethnic tension
existed in the DRC prior to the Rwandan genocide, tension rose when
Ugandans and Rwandans entered the DRC following the genocide.43 The
ethnic tension is tied to economic status and political power and is
complicated by the sheer multitude of ethnic groups in the region.44 While a
full discussion on ethnic tension is unnecessary for this paper, it should be
noted that rebel groups generally do not have members from multiple ethnic
groups.45
Two other corresponding causes of the violence that must be noted are
the lack of legitimate economic opportunity and government. Without
economic opportunities to provide income, many Congolese are pushed
towards the violence as a means to provide for themselves and their families.
Without a functioning government to enforce laws, there are no
repercussions for their actions.
While many of the general causes of the violence are due to the
complexity of the situation, the specific reasons for the violence, such as
what land is fought over by what groups, are largely unknown. The impact
of not understanding the “full picture” of the situation will be discussed
throughout this paper.

41

Id.
Background: The Congo Conflict, PEACEBUILDINGDATA.ORG, http://www.peacebuild
ingdata.org/drc/congo-conflict (last visited Oct. 11, 2013).
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
42
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Source: A Map of the DRC, The World Factbook46

46

CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE, THE WORLD FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html (last visited
Nov. 9, 2013) (Exhibit A: Map of the DRC. Note that Kinshasa lies on the western part of
the country, while the present day conflict is mainly in the east on the Rwandan and
Ugandan border, around the city of Goma).
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III. MINERALS: A FACTOR BEHIND THE VIOLENCE
The DRC is extremely rich in natural resources. Besides timber and
rubber, the DRC contains, among others, diamonds, gold, tin, tungsten, and
tantalum (herein coltan).47 The following table displays estimates of gold,
tin, tungsten, and coltan located in the DRC.
Amount
estimated to be
produced in
DRC annually

Percentof world
production
within DRC

Common Uses

Tin

24,000 metric
tons.

6-8%

Solders, tin
plates, chemicals.

Tungsten

1,300 metric
tons.

2-4%

Tools, alloy,
tungsten steel.

Coltan

155 metric
tons.

15-20%

Capacitors for
cell phones,
automobiles,
computers, and
other electronics.

Gold

6.5 tons.

Unknown

Jewelry, coins,
electronics.

Source: The Business of a Better World48
Although the four minerals listed in the chart are the focus of the DoddFrank Act, the most fascinating mineral is coltan, a mineral unknown to
many. Coltan is essential for electronics and is used in capacitors, which are
47

Because the Dodd-Frank Act only includes tin, tungsten, coltan and gold, the many
other resources found in the DRC will not be discussed.
48
BSR, Conflict Minerals and the Democratic Republic of the Congo – Responsible
Actions in Supply Chains, Government Engagement and Capacity Building (May 2010),
available at http://www.bsr.org/reports/BSR_Conflict_Minerals_and_the_DRC.pdf.
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needed for nearly every electronic item. Put simply, cell phones and other
electronics would not be able to function without coltan.
Unsurprisingly, the development of the cell phone industry and other
electronics has increased the demand for coltan. Coltan garnered
international attention in the early 2000s during the rapid increase in
consumption of electronics; coltan prices went up ten-folds in fear of a
shortage of the precious mineral.49 The price increase fueled a global fear
that electronics would increase in price or become unavailable.50 Although
the price of coltan decreased, spikes continue to occur.51
The process by which coltan, gold, tungsten, and tin are extracted is a
complex byproduct of the continuing conflict and disarray. While some of
the minerals are extracted from large mines, many are initially extracted by
artisanal miners—miners who do not use or use minimal, mechanical tools
and extract minerals on a small scale. 52 Once extracted, the minerals are
transferred between sales agents, trading houses, exporters, and traders.53
49
Blaine Harden, A Dirt in the New Machine, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/12/magazine/the-dirt-in-the-new machine.Html?page
wanted=all&src=pm.
50
Id.
51
Jeffery W. Mantz, Improvisational Economies: Coltan Production in the Eastern
Congo, Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale (2008) at 34–50, available at
http://mason.gmu.edu/~jmantz/Improvisational%20Economies.pdf. For a chart on price
fluctuations from 2007-2010, see Lisa Reisman, Tantalum Prices About to Go Through
The Roof?, METALMINER (Jan. 20, 2011), available at http://agmetalminer.com/2011
/01/20/tantalum-prices-about-through-the-roof/.
52
BSR, supra note 48, at 5. Thirteen large mines and over 200 small mines have been
documented in the DRC. The Congolese government does not recognize the legitimacy
of most of these artisanal mines, and, therefore, the process is carried out illegally. This
subjects the miners to exploitation by rebel groups because the miners cannot seek
government support or protection. Id. The extraction of the minerals is a dangerous
process. With no safety restrictions, many miners are injured or killed. The
environmental impact of mining should also be mentioned. Unlike regulated mines with
environmental restrictions, the artisanal miners are not subject to such, and therein are
able to proceed in whatever manner they see fit, with no consideration of the long or
short term impact to the environment. These impacts include deforestation and water
pollution. Id. at 9–10.
53
See id. at 13.
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Before leaving the DRC, the minerals may have exchanged hands more
than a dozen times and been mixed with minerals from other mines.54 With
so many exchanges, it is unsurprising that upon exportation most minerals
are of an unknown origin, leaving the buyer completely unaware of the
specific mine from which the minerals were extracted.55
Although the minerals are normally exported to Asia–where they are
processed into goods to be sold worldwide–it is important to discuss East
Africa’s role in the trade. Countries like Rwanda and Uganda have little to
no natural stock of the minerals discussed but still derive a substantial profit
from the exportation of these minerals. 56 The profit is a result of illegal
exportation of the minerals. For example, Uganda, which shares a border
with the DRC, is said to traffic gold from the DRC and export millions of
dollars worth of it to the United Arab Emirates and other countries. 57
Unsurprisingly, because of the large financial gain at stake, many of these
East African countries are financially supporting the rebel groups within the
DRC.58

54

Id.
Id.
Daniel R. Donovan, Mineral Smuggling in Central Africa: The Case of Rwanda,
Uganda, and Perpetual Violence in the DRC, CAI – CONSULTANCY AFRICA
INTELLIGENCE (Feb. 18, 2013, 6:20 AM), http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php
?option=com_content&view=article&id=1222:mineral-smuggling-in-central-africa-thecase-of-rwanda-uganda-and-perpetual-violence-in-the-drc-&catid=57:africa-watchdiscussion-papers&Itemid=263.
57
BSR, supra note 48, at 8.
58
Id. at 8. For example, Tanzania is believed to support an arms dealer that aids one of
the rebel groups in the DRC. Donovan, supra note 63. Likewise, both Uganda and
Rwanda have been documented as providing financial, along with military support, in the
region. But see Comments of William M. Ngeleja, Minister of Energy and Minerals,
United Republic of Tanzania, Release No. 34-63547; File No. S7-40-10 (May 23, 2011)
(claiming, “Tanzania has, at no point, sought to pursue any strategic or self-interested
objectives in the DRC. Furthermore, the United Republic of Tanzania has consequently
managed to avoid direct involvement in the conflict around DRC”).
55
56
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A. Rebel Control of the Mineral Trade and Congolese Civilians
With such a complex process of exportation and lack of stability in the
DRC, rebel groups are able to obtain tremendous financial wealth from the
trade, thus allowing them to fund their violent tactics.59 There are two main
methods for which the rebel groups are able to obtain profits from the
minerals. 60 The first is by controlling the mines directly and renting the
space out to the miners, who in turn pay the rebels with money or
minerals. 61 The second is where the rebels do not control the mines but
impose an illegal tax on the minerals during the exportation process. 62
Pierre Englebert explains a detailed account of rebel control over mining:
[A]ctors, like rebel groups or chieftaincies, may also be able to tax
people, but they cannot do so legally and must resort to force or
popular legitimacy in order to manage levies on the income and
assets of people in the regions they control . . . . The Congolese
rebel organization RCD, for example, raised its own taxes in the
areas it controlled between 1998 and 2003, in addition to servicing
established Congolese taxes. It also set up its own monopsony for
the purchase of [coltan] . . . , which alone was allowed to market
coltan from diggers, in exchange for a monthly tax of $1
million . . . . Yet, many of these rebel taxes remain predicated on
physical control or on claims to sovereignty by the rebels. In
general, they take place at specific physical locations, like ports of
entry, where control can be more easily exercised . . . . In addition,
rebels make great use of the local remnants of sovereign state
institutions in their strategies of extraction. The RCD, for example,
mainly collected taxes through existing regional state agencies,
free-riding on their enduring sovereign nature.63

59

See BSR, supra note 48, at 5 (estimating that between 75 percent and 95 percent of
financing came from taxation of minerals).
60
Id. at 5.
61
Id. A recent report found that 12 of the major mines and over half of the 200 artisanal
mines were controlled directly by rebel groups. Id.
62
Id.
63
PIERRE ENGLEBERT, AFRICA: UNITY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SORROW 73–74 (2009).
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It is estimated that in 2008 alone, the rebel groups obtained over $185
million because of the mineral trade, thereby allowing them to purchase
more weapons and continue the violence.64
Although the mining and exportation process has caused continued
violence in the region, many Congolese rely economically on the mineral
trade. At least one million people rely on the mineral trade as a source of
revenue, while the World Bank estimates, “10 million Congolese (16
percent of the population) in total are in some way dependant [sic] on the
artisanal mining industry in the country.”65 As will be seen further in this
article, any legislation that impacts the mining sector has and will continue
to substantially impact the Congolese civilians.

IV. LEGISLATION IN RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS
A. The DRC’s Approach
In an effort to stabilize the region and legitimize the mineral trade, the
Congolese government has made numerous attempts to create legislation.
For example, “the DRC’s Mining Law of 2002 require[d] community
consultations, disclosure of contract terms by both companies and the
government, and revenue transparency through adherence to EITI
guidelines.”66
But while attempts have been made by the Congolese government to
stabilize the region and legitimize the trade, there are various reasons why
they have not succeeded. Lack of transparency and corruption are two of the
key problems that have hindered the process. The DRC ranked 160 out of

64

A Comprehensive Approach to Congo’s Conflict Minerals – Strategy Paper, ENOUGH
PROJECT (Apr. 24, 2009), http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/comprehensiveapproach-conflict-minerals-strategy-paper.
65
BSR, supra note 48, at 5.
66
Clementine Burnley, Natural Resources Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo: A Question of Governance?, 12 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 7, 10 (2011).
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178 in the 2012 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index.67
Many politicians act in their own interest, while government agents have
been known to illegally tax the mining operations in the DRC and justify
those acts based on a lack of government-supplied income.68
Another reason the government has failed to stabilize the trade via
legislation is that the government has not protected the trade routes
themselves. 69 Even if transparency initiatives were effective and revenue
was documented, there is no guarantee that purchasers would stop obtaining
minerals from rebel groups controlling the supply chain. 70 Regardless of
what peace initiatives are put into place, if the trade routes continue to be
used in the same manner they presently are, purchasers will continue to
finance the rebel groups.
In September 2010, the Congolese government implemented a mining
ban in the rebel territory.71 Given that the ban was implemented when the
Dodd-Frank Act was being finalized, it is uniformly believed to have been a
response to the Act.72 Many gave credit to Kabila, arguing it was a good
sign that the government was willing to take financial losses in order to
stabilize the region.73
Although the 2010 ban was hailed by many as a positive step, it raises
important considerations about the impact of legislation.74 When Kabila and
67

Corruption Perception Indexes 2012, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL,
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).
68
See Clementine Burnley, Natural Resources Conflict in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo: A Question of Governance?, 12 SUSTAINABLE DEV. LAW & POL’Y 7, 8
(2011).
69
BSR, supra note 48, at 13.
70
Seay, supra note 7, at 15.
71
DR Congo Bans Mining in Eastern Provinces, BBC (Sep. 11, 2010), available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11269360.
72
See Seay, supra note 7, at 15.
73
E.g. Anne DeVoe, Carrying a Piece of Congo in Our Pockets: Global Complicity to
Congo’s Sexual Violence and the Conflict Minerals Trade, 10 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST.
463, 465 (hailing “President Kabila’s temporary ban [as] a positive step towards policy
reform on conflict minerals”).
74
E.g., id.
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his military were enforcing the mining ban, it was the Congolese civilians
who suffered the most. It is estimated that during the ban one to two million
artisanal miners were out of work.75 As Professor Laura Seay points out,
when one considers that each of these miners has roughly five to six
dependents, the Act “inadvertently and directly negatively affected up to
five to twelve million Congolese civilians.”76 The loss of income increased
rates of hunger, disease, and death.77
At the same time, the ban failed to achieve the goal of decreasing the
control of the trade by rebel groups because nothing was done to remove the
rebels. Instead, the groups stayed in place or advanced their efforts by
expanding their smuggling routes and diversifying their exports.78 The ban
lasted until March 2011.79
Two schools of thought exist regarding mining bans. The first has a
negative view towards them, believing that, whether done by the Congolese
government or outside states exporting the minerals, banning conflict
minerals will not work.80 It is argued that imposing a blanket ban will cause
the civilian populations dependent on the mineral trade to suffer but will not
impact the rebel groups substantially because, instead of exporting the
minerals through the banned territories, the groups will make efforts to
export the minerals through other areas of the DRC or neighboring
countries.81 This occurred during the 2010 ban.82
Even if only minerals obtained via conflict are banned, issues still arise
because it is nearly impossible to trace a product that has changed hands so
75

Seay, supra note 7, at 15.
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 16.
79
See The Associated Press, Congo: Government Lifts Mining Ban Amid Criticism, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/11/world/africa
/11briefs-Congo.html?_r=0.
80
BSR, supra note 48, at 12.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 16.
76
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many times. The problem is complicated by the fact that the mines are not
regulated, and so the traceability essentially fails from the start.
Those in favor of a mining ban acknowledge that it is difficult to
differentiate between legitimate minerals and those mined illegally and,
therefore, argue that a blanket ban should be put in place until the region is
stabilized.83 Supporters argue that a “temporary, carefully-implemented ban”
could work if “coupled with large-scale regional assistance and probably
managed through international institutions” as “part of a solution” with “the
ultimate goal [being] to develop effective, verifiably conflict-free sourcing
from the region, in collaboration with industry, NGO and other efforts.”84
Although this sounds like a simple solution, it would not only be ineffective
for the reasons listed above, but it would also be very damaging to the wellbeing of the Congolese. The “regional assistance” proposed by the
supporters would be nearly impossible to provide given that millions of
people rely on the trade, and many of those people live in remote regions.
B. Other International Policies Attempted
Regional programs have been developed to stabilize the situation in the
DRC. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(“OECD”) designed auditing guidelines for mineral processors. 85 The
International Conference of the Great Lakes “committed to a regional
certification mechanism, which provides a clear procedure and adequate
records of mineral origins.” 86 The International Tin Research Initiative
83

Id. at 12.
See id. But at the same time it is argued that a “temporary, carefully-implemented ban”
could work if “coupled with large-scale regional assistance and probably managed
through international institutions” as “part of a solution” with “the ultimate goal [being]
to develop effective, verifiably conflict-free sourcing from the region, in collaboration
with industry, NGO and other efforts.” Id.
85
Burnley, supra note 68, at 10.
86
Id. It is questionable whether neighboring countries’ efforts are made in good faith. Id.
Neighboring countries have a strong incentive not to stabilize the region due to the
substantial profits that many of them make from the mineral trade. Id. Stabilization would
84
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worked to increase “due diligence, traceability, and certification processes
for tin through the Tin Supply Chain Initiative.”87 Unsurprisingly, each of
these programs has battled over issues “relating to cost, implementation,
monitoring, human capacity, and resource gaps.”88
Outside of Africa, efforts have been made to create traceability
regulations and schemes. One such scheme is PROMINES, a collaborative
effort between the DRC government, the World Bank, and industry
members that aims to regulate and strengthen the mining sector.89 While
PROMINES is a different approach designed by those involved in the
mineral trade, it has been “largely ignored and/or confused with the mess
surrounding” the Dodd-Frank Act.90

V. US RESPONSE TO CONFLICT MINERALS – THE DODD-FRANK ACT
Over the past decade, global awareness regarding the use of minerals that
finance the Congolese violence has increased substantially. This is in part
due to the accessibility of information via the Internet, but the efforts of
nonprofit groups and reporters have had a substantial impact as well.91
There has been a push to decrease or abolish the use of conflict minerals
in American products because of the growing concern over the conflict in

decrease these governments’ incomes and the personal profits politicians obtain from the
trade. See BSR, supra note 48, at 8.
87
Burnley, supra note 68, at 10.
88
Id. See also Seay, supra note 7, at 20.
89
Seay, supra note 7, at 20.
90
Id. A long discussion of other international responses to the crisis, including those by
individual corporations, countries, and international organizations, could be included here.
Due to the focus of this paper, however, the discussion will skip this and instead focus
solely on US efforts.
91
Examples of groups seeking to raise awareness regarding the conflict include The
Enough Project, which is headed by John Prendergast, former advisor to Condoleezza
Rice and award-winning activist. This group aims to raise awareness and seek sustainable
change in the DRC. See, e.g., Enough Project, http://www.enoughproject.org/ (last visited
Nov. 4, 2013). Likewise, news agencies, particularly those such as BBC and the New
York Times, have critically discussed the issue in various articles.
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the region. 92 One of the initiatives, House Bill 4128, sought to prevent
“articles made wholly or in part with components containing conflict
minerals from facilities that have not been audited in accordance with [the
legislation]” from being imported. 93 The Bill would have subjected
companies to audits and required that all products be marked with the
contained mineral’s country of origin. 94 This drastic blanket approach
ultimately failed.95
A. What the Dodd-Frank Act Entails
The latest attempt to stabilize the region is the Dodd-Frank Consumer
Protection Act, signed into law by President Barack Obama on July 21,
2010.96 The Act was designed to address many of the economic pitfalls that
led to the recent financial crisis.97 But buried within the Act is Section 1502,
which is allegedly aimed at securing peace and stability within the DRC.98
The opening text of the section states the following:
It is the sense of Congress that the exploitation and trade of
conflict minerals originating in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo is helping to finance conflict characterized by extreme
levels of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo,
particularly sexual- and gender-based violence, and contributing to

92

Conflict Minerals Trade Act, H.R. 4128, 111th Cong. (2009). As will be discussed
below, many corporations have sought to oppose the abolition of conflict minerals
because it would mean that there would be higher input costs from products obtained
elsewhere for legitimate prices. Id.
93
Id at § 7(b).
94
Id at § 6(c)(2)(B)(v).
95
For reasons discussed previously, a blanket ban would not likely have been effective
in reducing the violence in the region and would have made it difficult to trace where the
minerals originated and if they were truly conflict free.
96
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th
Cong. (2010).
97
Id.
98
Id at § 1502.
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an emergency humanitarian situation therein, warranting [the
subsequent provisions].99
The subsequent provisions describe what is to be enforced. The main
thrust of the text is that any companies using conflict minerals—which for
purposes of this legislation are tin, tungsten, coltan, and gold—in their
products are required to report whether the minerals originated from the
DRC or “adjoining countries” if the conflict minerals are “necessary to the
functionality or production of the product.” 100 Products that are “conflict
free” are described as “not contain[ing] conflict minerals that directly or
indirectly finance or benefit armed groups in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo or an adjoining country” and are not subject to the legislation.101
But if the minerals within the product did originate in one of the specified
countries, the company must report to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) what efforts were made “to exercise due diligence on
the source and chain of custody of such minerals.”102
The report must include “[t]he measures taken to exercise due
diligence[,] . . . includ[ing] an independent private sector audit of the report
that is conducted in accordance with standards established by the
Comptroller General of the United States.” 103 Each report requires a
description of the products manufactured or contracted to be manufactured
that are not “DRC conflict free,” the facilities used to process the conflict
minerals, the country of origin of the conflict minerals, and the efforts to

99

Id at § 1502(a).
Conflict Minerals, supra note 1, at 56, 293. Issuers must comply with the final rule for
the calendar year beginning January 1, 2013, with the first reports due May 31, 2014.
Conflict Minerals, supra note 1. “Adjoining countries” only includes those sharing a
geographical border with the DRC. Therefore, countries such as Kenya and Tanzania
who export the minerals do not require labeling.
101
Id. at 56, 322.
102
Id. at 56, 329.
103
Id. at 56, 274.
100

VOLUME 12 • ISSUE 2 • 2013

623

624 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

determine the mine or location of origin.104 After formulating a report the
issuer must make it “available to the public on its Internet Web site.”105
Essentially, Section 1502 requires a process of self-reporting whereby
those companies providing products containing “conflict minerals” are
required to submit a report if it is believed that any of the minerals
originated in the DRC or neighboring countries. The report, which is subject
to a private audit, must discuss what efforts were made to ensure that the
minerals did not contribute to the ongoing conflict and were legitimately
mined and exported. Upon disclosing that the products contain conflict
minerals from the DRC or surrounding region, the company must then
make such information available to the public via their company website.
The flowchart in Appendix A shows the process with which companies are
to proceed.106

VI. WEAKENING OF THE LEGISLATION DUE TO CORPORATE
LOBBYISTS AND OTHER INFLUENCES
Although American legislation aimed at improving the conditions within
Africa is undoubtedly a positive step towards the acknowledgement of an
interdependent economic world and the impact the United States has on the
Congolese crisis, the actual text of the legislation, the changes made during
the legislative process, and the legislation’s ultimate impact (both thus far
and in the future) must be critically analyzed. The first piece of this section
will look at changes made to the legislation during its creation and the
significant loopholes because of these changes. Next, the broader problems
with the Act will be explored. Finally, the Act’s impact in the DRC will be
examined.

104

Id. at 56, 275.
Id. at 56, 274.
106
Id. at 56, 283.
105
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A. The Exclusion of Mining Issuers Reduces the Effectiveness of the Act and
Places an Additional Burden on Reporting Companies
In the original draft of the legislation, mining issuers107 were considered
to be manufacturers and were thus subject to the reporting rules. 108 This
requirement has now been changed so that mining issuers need not report
unless they “also engage in manufacturing.”109
Lobbying by the National Mining Association (herein the “Association”)
was likely a substantial reason for the exclusion.110 The Association argues
that issuers are not perpetuating the violence in the DRC because they have
“secure supply chains.”111 The Association also argued that Congress has
not intended to include issuers as manufacturers based on a plain reading of
the statute, previous versions of the applicable section, and legislative
statements.112
In excluding issuers, the Commission referred to the prior versions of the
Conflict Mineral Statutory Provisions, which defined issuers to be anyone
engaged in “the commercial exploration, extraction, importation,
exportation or sale of the covered minerals.”113 The Commission reasoned

107

A mining issuer is one that “engages in the commercial development” of minerals.
Development includes the “exploration, extraction, processing, export, and other
significant actions relating to oil, natural gas, or minerals, or the acquisition of a license
for any such activity.” Conflict Minerals, Securities Act Release No. 34-63547 (Dec. 23,
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2010/34-63547.pdf.
108
Conflict Minerals, supra note 1, at 56, 292.
109
Id. at 56, 280.
110
Comments of National Mining Association to Securities Act Release No. 34-63547,
(Dec. 23, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-393.pdf.
(“Indeed, publicly-traded mining issuers, with their largely integrated and secure supply
chains, were never identified in the legislative process as a cause or contributor to the
problem of armed conflict in the DRC region…”).
111
Id.
112
See Comment of Srinivasan Venkatakrishnan, CFO, AngloGold Ashanti Limited,
Johannesburg, South Africa at 8, to Securities Act Release No. 34-63547 (Dec. 23, 2010),
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-52.pdf.
113
Conflict Minerals, supra note 1, at 56, 293 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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that because the language had been removed, it was an intentional
substantive change to the legislation.114
Those in favor of including issuers argue that a potential pitfall of the
exclusion is that other companies relying on issuers’ information regarding
the status of the minerals now cannot do so, thus making it harder for
companies to adhere to the Act and identify whether their minerals are
conflict free. 115 Similar to this is the argument that, from a practical
standpoint, it would make more sense to address the issue from the point of
origin before the minerals are exported abroad. By excluding mining issuers,
the Commission reduced the burden on the mining issuers but heightened
the burden on the other companies required to report under the Act. The
task of determining whether the minerals are conflict free would have been
easier if they were labeled at the start when they were extracted.
B. The Exclusion of Minerals from Scrap and Recycled Sources Creates
Line Drawing Problems and Creates an Opportunity for Products to be
Mislabeled
In the proposed text of the legislation, the Act included minerals from
recycled and scrap sources.116 As the text stood:
[A]n issuer with conflict minerals that originated from recycled or
scrap sources would have been required to disclose in its annual
report, under the “Conflict Minerals Disclosure” heading, that its
conflict minerals were obtained from recycled or scrap sources and
that it furnished a Conflict Minerals Report regarding those
recycled or scrap minerals. Also, under the proposed rules, an
issuer would have been required to state that its products
114

Id. at 56, 293.
Id. at 56, 292. See also Comments of Corinna Gilfillan, Head of US Office for Global
Witness, Washington, District of Columbia to Securities Act Release No. 34-63547 (Dec.
23, 2010), at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-508.pdf; Comments of
John Sharp, TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., Hillsboro, Oregon at 1-2, to Securities Act
Release No. 34-63547 (Dec. 23, 2010), at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-4010/s74010-194.pdf.
116
Conflict Minerals, supra note 1, at 56, 329.
115
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containing or produced with recycled or scrap minerals in the
Conflict Minerals Report were considered “DRC conflict free.” In
addition, such an issuer would have described the measures taken
to exercise due diligence in determining that its conflict minerals
were recycled or scrap and obtain an independent private sector
audit of that report.117
Several concerns resulted from the proposed reporting of recycled goods.
First was the fear that the requirement would detour companies from using
recycled sources, therein decreasing the reuse of products and increasing the
amount of usable products in landfills.118 Second was the concern regarding
the difficulty in tracing where the minerals had originally been obtained.119
The National Mining Association emphasized that “the focus of such an
inquiry should be the ‘recycled source/origin,’ or point at which the conflict
mineral reentered the supply chain after being recycled, not the point at
which the recycled conflict mineral was originally mined.” 120 This
particular focus would reduce the burden on the companies who would
otherwise struggle with discovering the origin points. Third was the
argument that armed groups in the DRC are profiting from newly-mined
minerals via taxation and control over the mines, and not from the reuse of
the goods containing conflict minerals was another argument.121
Not all lobbyists pushed to exclude minerals from scrap and recycled
sources outright. Some lobbyists pushed to change the definitions of
recycled and scrap minerals and sources.122 Other lobbyists suggested that
117

Id. at 56, 329–56, 330.
Id. at 56, 330.
119
Id.
120
Comments of The National Mining Association at 15, to Securities Act Release No.
34-63547, (Dec. 23, 2010), at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-393.pdf.
121
Conflict Minerals, supra note 1, at 56, 332.
122
Id. at 56, 331. See also Comment of Karen Savala, President, Semiconductor
Equipment and Materials International (SEMI) Americas, Release No. 34-63547; File No.
S7-40-10 (Feb. 15, 2011) (stating: “if those minerals are reclaimed end-user or postconsumer products but would not consider those minerals “recycled” if they are partially
processed, unprocessed, or a byproduct from another ore.” Further stating: “a conflict
mineral or a conflict mineral derivative that is within, or has been reclaimed from, a used
118
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companies not be subject to the Act if a majority of the minerals came from
recycled or scrap sources.123 Many others presented different definitions for
recycled and scrapped sources.
After the proposals were made, a concrete definition of recycled and
scrap materials was adopted pursuant to the Organization for Economic and
Cooperation Development definition.124 For purposes of the Act, “conflict
minerals are considered to be from recycled or scrap sources if they are
from recycled metals, which are reclaimed end-user or post-consumer
products, or scrap processed metals created during product
manufacturing.” 125 Further, “recycled metal includes excess, obsolete,
defective, and scrap metal materials that contain refined or processed metals
that are appropriate to recycle in the production of tin, tantalum, tungsten
and/or gold.” 126 Lastly, “minerals partially processed, unprocessed, or a
byproduct from another ore [are] not … included in the definition of
recycled metal.”127
The reporting measures for recycled and scrap metals are now such that if
a manufacturer inquires and has reason to believe that the minerals may not
be from recycled or scrap sources, then “it must exercise due diligence.”128
If a manufacturer is unable to determine whether the minerals are from a
recycled or scrap source, then a Conflict Minerals Report is required.129 But

product that was collected directly from the last product end user, or that was collected
from a municipal waste stream.”).
123
Comment of Srinivasan Venkatakrishnan, CFO, AngloGold Ashanti Limited,
Johannesburg, South Africa, Release No 34-063547; File No. S7-40-10 (Jan. 31, 2011).
124
Conflict Minerals, supra note 1, at 56, 332.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
The legislators specifically stated that if a “due diligence framework becomes
available… issuers will be required to utilize that framework.” Id. at 56, 282. Therefore,
while companies are expected to follow the due diligence procedures for gold, it is
unclear what due diligence procedures shall be followed for the other three minerals. Id.
at 56, 333.
129
Conflict Minerals, supra note 1, at 56, 333.
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if manufacturers do believe that they have used recycled or scrap minerals,
they are not required to submit a Conflict Minerals Report and instead must
“disclose how they have determined that sources are genuine scrap
recycled.”130 The intent of such a disclosure is to avoid “laundering” new
minerals to label them as recycled.131
It is unclear what oversight will be provided to ensure that companies
accurately disclose their sources. Given that there are enormous costs
associated with this legislation, there is an incentive to misrepresent new
minerals as scrap and recycled.132 If little or no oversight is provided, then
new minerals could intentionally be excluded from reporting.133 Therefore,
it is unclear if the intent behind the disclosure—to stop laundering—will be
effective.
The potential for unintentional wrongful disclosures is also a concern.
American companies could potentially purchase minerals from other parts
of the world, such as China or India, believing them to be scrap or recycled.
Companies who purchase these minerals from “recyclers” will likely be
unable to tell if they are recycled or scrap or have just been made to appear
as such. These minerals could in turn be reported as “conflict free.”

130
Comments of Robert Walker, Vice President, ESG Services, NEI Investments,
Vancouver, Canada at 20, to Securities Act Release No. 34-63547 (Dec. 23, 2010), at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-128.pdf.
131
Id. at 2.
132
Conflict Minerals, supra note 1, at 56, 334. “[I]t is likely that the initial cost of
compliance is approximately $3 billion to $4 billion, while the annual cost of ongoing
compliance will be between $207 million and $609 million.” Id.
133
Although companies are subject to auditing, if the risk of being “caught” is low and
the cost of accurately reporting high, companies may untruthfully report. This risk is true
throughout the Act and is a byproduct of the self-reporting scheme.
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C. The “Necessary to the Functionality” Requirement is not Clearly
Defined and Allows Companies to Determine Whether Their Products are
Subject to the Act
Companies are required to subject themselves to the rules of the Act if
the conflict minerals are “necessary to the functionality or production of the
product.”134 Upon review and during the comments period, many questions
were raised regarding what constituted “necessary.” In the final version of
the Act, there is no definition. 135 Instead, “guidance regarding the
interpretation of these phrases” is given. 136 Regarding the functionality
requirement, the legislation states what a company should consider:
(a) Whether a conflict mineral is contained in and intentionally
added to the product or any component of the product and is not a
naturally-occurring by-product; (b) whether a conflict mineral is
necessary to the product’s generally expected function, use, or
purpose; or (c) if a conflict mineral is incorporated for purposes of
ornamentation, decoration or embellishment, whether the primary
purpose of the product is ornamentation or decoration.137
If a product fits under one or more of these categories, then the company is
required to follow the reporting process.138 The text of these parameters was
intentionally left broad so as to allow companies to determine whether they
are within the scope of the legislation.139
The concern with the flexible language is that companies may incorrectly
find that the minerals are not necessary to the functionality of their products.
Whether done intentionally or unintentionally, the misclassifying of the
product as not containing minerals “necessary to the functionality” reduces
any potential positive impact the legislation may have.

134

Conflict Minerals, supra note 1, at 56, 293.
Id. at 56, 295.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
135
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D. The Exclusion of Conflict Minerals Used for Production of Goods
Reduces the Effectiveness of the Act
Initial drafts of the legislation required that companies be subject to the
legislation if the conflict minerals were “necessary to the … production.”140
This would have included companies using machinery or products
containing conflict minerals in the manufacturing of products. The language
was changed in the final bill, which now states that “the conflict mineral
must be contained in the product” to subject it to the reporting
requirements.141
As it stands, a manufacturer should consider “whether a conflict mineral
is contained in the product and intentionally added in the product’s
production process.” 142 This includes “the production process of any
component of the product; and whether the conflict mineral is necessary to
produce the product.”143
Many groups argued that the requirement of reporting goods made with
the help of conflict minerals, but which did not actually contain them,
would have substantially broadened the legislation.144 They further argued
that the burden placed on companies to discover which equipment
contained conflict minerals would have been extensive. The Association
Connecting Electronic Industries made all of these arguments during the
review process. 145 In addition, the company noted that reporting on the
production “may be unnecessarily duplicative, as any issuer manufacturing
tools or machinery would be required to comply with the proposal if

140

Id. at 56, 296.
Id. at 56, 297.
142
Id. at 56, 295.
143
Id.
144
See id. at 56, 297.
145
FERN ABRAMS, IPC- ASS’N CONNECTING ELECTRONIC INDUS. COMMENTS ON SEC
PROPOSED RULE ON CONFLICT MINERALS, 1 (Mar. 2, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010.shtml.
141
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conflict minerals are necessary for the functionality of the tool or
machine.”146
While the exclusion of production products not containing conflict
minerals themselves simplifies the legislation and reduces double counting,
it weakens the effect of the legislation. If companies that use conflict
minerals in their tools and equipment purchase the tools from companies
that are not required to report, such as foreign companies, then the conflict
minerals within the equipment are never subject to the Act. Arguably,
including goods used in production would have broadened the legislation
and been outside of the original scope, but it would have better helped
achieve the legislature’s objective.
E. The Exclusion of Generic Goods Allows Companies to Escape Reporting
Requirements
Initially, the Act stated that an “issuer that does not manufacture a
product itself but that has ‘any’ influence over the product’s manufacturing”
would be “considered to be contracting to manufacture that product,” and
therefore made to follow the reporting procedures.147 During the comments
period, many concerns were raised regarding companies who sell generic
goods produced by other companies but sold under the store’s labels. 148
Those in favor of excluding companies selling generics, including Target,
Lowe’s, J.C. Penney, Costco, and Wal-Mart, were able to weaken the
legislation and relieve themselves of such responsibility.149
As it stands, companies limiting themselves to the following are absolved
from reporting:
146

Id. at 6.
Conflict Minerals, supra note 1, at 56, 291.
148
Id. 56, 290.
149
Jessica Hozer, Wal-Mart, Target Avoid Mineral Rules, WALL STREET JOURNAL
ONLINE (Aug. 22, 2012, 8:26 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444
082904577605630361858586.html (noting some of the generic goods which contain
conflict minerals include tin cans of food, light bulbs, and clothing items, including
shoes).
147
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(a) Specifying or negotiating contractual terms with a manufacturer
that do not directly relate to the manufacturing of the product, such
as training or technical support, price, insurance, indemnity,
intellectual property rights, dispute resolution, or other like terms
or conditions concerning the product, unless the issuer specifies or
negotiates taking these actions so as to exercise a degree of
influence over the manufacturing of the product that is practically
equivalent to contracting on terms that directly relate to the
manufacturing of the product; or
(b) Affixing its brand, marks, logo, or label to a generic product
manufactured by a third party; or
(c) Servicing, maintaining, or repairing a product manufactured by
a third party. 150
It is unclear what “exercising a degree of influence” includes. The original
proposed language included “any influence.”151 This was determined to be
too broad, while the commentator’s proposal for “substantial influence” was
deemed to be too narrow. 152 But the lack of clear parameters for “any
influence” is apt to cause problems and errors in reporting because, just like
other language within the Act, it allows companies to mistakenly or
intentionally misclassify their products.
Beyond unclear language is another potential loophole: non-reporting
companies (those outside of the United States) can supply generic goods to
retailers. In turn, retailers will be able to sell the “American” goods while
avoiding legislation and associated costs. Not only does this potential
loophole encourage overseas production, but it also decreases the potential
effect of legislation.
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Conflict Minerals, supra note 1, at 56, 291.
Id. at 56, 291.
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VII. BROADER ISSUES WITH THE DESIGN OF THE ACT
Beyond specific concerns regarding definitions, inclusions, exclusions,
and loopholes, many broader concerns are raised regarding the implications
of the Act. Among others, these concerns include the issue of self-reporting,
the delay in implementing the Act, the costs in implementing the Act, and
how it will impact the American economy. This section discusses these
concerns and whether they are legitimate or unwarranted. First though, it is
necessary to consider the Kimberley Process when analyzing the Act and its
potential implications.
The Kimberley Process, the international response to the illegal diamond
trade, requires that governments certify their diamonds as conflict free
before exporting them to be processed. 153 Each exporting and importing
country that is participating in the process must follow set guidelines.154 The
program has been met with mixed success, with supporters erroneously
arguing that it ended wars in Sierra Leone and Angola.155
While the process has not ended wars or the illegal diamond trade, it has
had some success in holding countries accountable for their imports and
exports and making consumers aware that diamonds fuel conflicts.156 These
successes support some prospect of similar legislation dealing with conflict
minerals having an impact, but still not solving the root problems fueling
the crisis. However, it is important to remember when comparing the Act
with the Kimberley Process that 75 countries currently participate in the
Process. 157 The Act will have just one. Therefore, if limited success has
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The Kimberley Process, GLOBAL WITNESS, http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/
conflict/conflict-diamonds/kimberley-process (last visited Mar. 27, 2013). Much of the
Dodd-Frank 1502 was created with Kimberly in mind, with many members who created
the Process aiding in Franks creation. Seay, supra note 7, at 22-23.
154
The Kimberley Process, supra note 153.
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See Seay, supra note 7, at 22–23 (detailing the nature of the wars in these areas).
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Seay, supra note 7, at 22–23.
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The Kimberley Process, supra note 153.
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been met with a global program, a much smaller success can be expected
from the Act.
A. Self-Reporting Will Inevitably Lead to Inconsistent Reporting and
Companies Intentionally Excluding Products Containing Conflict Minerals
from the Reporting Process
A common theme throughout this paper is the issue of self-reporting. As
explained previously, the legislation requires that the company, and not an
outside regulator, report whether the products fall within the scope of the
legislation. Undoubtedly this process creates less work in terms of
government oversight because the company, and not a government-hired
analyst, can determine if the product falls within the scope of the legislation.
But self-reporting may raise the risk that companies will dishonestly
classify their products as outside the scope of the Act.158
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the agency responsible
for implementing and monitoring the reporting, has explained that it will
impose standard penalties for non-compliance “such as fines and other SEC
enforcement actions to which firms that violate SEC regulations may be
subject.”159 But to actually detour companies from untruthfully classifying
their products, the potential consequences (such as liability or fees) must
outweigh the risk. Simply put, if no one is penalized for misrepresentation,
or if the fees are too low compared to the costs of adhering to the legislation,
then companies may be motivated to wrongly classify their products. A
standardized approach used by a trained outside source would be costly, but
it would reduce the chance of abuse and create a more consistent system.

158

The incentive to find products to be outside of the scope of the legislation comes as
financial savings, and also a savings of company time in tracing the minerals and
reporting to the SEC.
159
NICHOLAS COOK, CONFLICT MINERALS IN CENTRAL AFRICA: US AND
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 9 (July 20, 2012),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42618.pdf.
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B. The Delay in Implementation and Exclusion of Minerals Already within
the Supply Chain Prior to the Specified Date Delays any Positive Impact of
the Act and Allows for the Stockpiling of Minerals
Due to lobbyists, the Act now allows a transition period for companies to
implement the new system of regulation over time. For larger companies
the period is two years and for smaller companies the period is four years.160
During the transition period, companies may report their products as
“conflict undeterminable” if, after conducting a country of origin inquiry,
they are “unable to determine if their conflict minerals financed or benefited
armed groups” in the relevant countries, or if
[A]fter [the company’s] reasonable country of origin inquiry, …
they had a reason to believe that their necessary conflict minerals
may have originated in the Covered Countries and may not have
come from recycled or scrap sources and the information they
gathered as a result of their subsequently required exercise of due
diligence failed to clarify the conflict minerals’ country of origin,
whether the conflict minerals financed or benefited armed groups
in those countries, or whether the conflict minerals came from
recycled or scrap sources.161
Many lobbyists argue that the transition period is necessary because it
allows companies more time to develop their reporting and tracing system,
therein allowing them to pursue a less costly approach than if the transition
were immediate. 162 But the transition period will undoubtedly delay any
positive impact the Act does have.
Of greater concern is the date that minerals within the supply chain are
subject to the reporting requirement. The original draft of the Act did not
address minerals within the supply chain, but the final version of the Act
was changed to exclude minerals within the supply chain prior to January
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Conflict Minerals. supra note 1, at 56, 309.
Id.
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Id.
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31, 2013.163 Although the delay was arguably logistically necessary, it has
serious consequences. The largest is the issue of stockpiling conflict
minerals.
While tracing stockpiles would likely prove more difficult than tracing
recently mined minerals, the change to the legislation allows companies to
plan their extraction and exportation to reduce the burden imposed by the
legislation. With the change, companies are motivated to extract as many
minerals as possible and either smelt them or move them to a country not
covered by the legislation, such as Kenya. This allowance for stockpiled
minerals to escape reporting provides an incentive to pursue a “mad-dash”
for the minerals. Such a scramble is apt to increase violence over the access
to the minerals and to create increased environmental harm as more mines
are excavated at a faster pace.

163

“The final rule considers conflict minerals to be “outside the supply chain” only in the
following instances: After any columbite-tantalite, cassiterite, and wolframite minerals
have been smelted; after gold has been fully refined; or after any conflict mineral, or its
derivatives, that have not been smelted or fully refined are located outside of the Covered
Countries.” Conflict Minerals. supra note 1, at 56, 280. Lobbying efforts included that of
the National Mining Association, which, in attempts to weaken the legislation, argued,
“[a]s previously noted by NMA, depending on the point in the supply chain, conducting
due diligence on the source of existing stockpiles or inventories of conflict minerals
could be challenging if not impossible. Therefore, the final rule should either exempt
existing stockpiles from reporting requirements, or allow for extra flexibility in regard to
this type of disclosure. Furthermore, any stockpiles of minerals that pre-date the effective
date of the new rules should be completely exempt from reporting requirements.
However, should a manufacturer or company contracting to manufacture a product wish
to voluntarily include stockpiled minerals in their initial disclosure or Conflict Minerals
Report, they should be permitted to do so.” ELIZABETH M. MURPHY, NATI’L MINING
ASS’N, NATIONAL MINING ASSOCIATION ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION’S PROPOSED RULE IMPLEMENTING SECTION 1502
(CONFLICT MINERALS) OF THE DODD FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT, 15 (Nov. 1, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-4010/s74010.shtml.
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C. The SEC’s is not Suited to Implement and Monitor Legislation
Concerning Issues in the DRC
The SEC is charged with implementing and monitoring the Act.164 The
SEC’s mission is “to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient
markets, and facilitate capital formation.”165 While the monitoring of US
companies is within the sphere of the SEC’s mission, arguably the
monitoring of an international humanitarian crisis is not. 166 Jeffrey W.
Rubin, leader of the American Bar Association’s securities regulation
committee, recently stated, “The SEC has three principal statutory
mandates: investor protection, capital formation and fair and efficient
markets,” and “[n]one of these are mentioned in 1502 of Dodd-Frank.”167
The fear is that broadening the scope of the SEC’s duties will engage the
agency in international humanitarian issues. Such a role not only increases
the burden on the SEC, but also presents a risk that the steps taken by the
SEC may not be in the best interest of the DRC. This is because the SEC
was created for and is focused on US security, and the SEC employees do
not understand the full extent of the crisis or the impact the legislation will
have on the DRC.168
Those in favor of SEC control argue that the SEC has authority over the
corporations that are involved; therefore, the legislation is not
overreaching.169 This argument is sound—the SEC does have control over
the corporations impacted by the Act. But the argument fails to address the
164

The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity,
and Facilitates Capital Formation, US SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2013).
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Id.
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Id.
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Jesse Hamilton, SEC Battles African Warlords Under Dodd-Frank, BLOOMBERG
(Jun. 22, 2011, 9:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-23/sec-battlesafrican-warlords-under-dodd-frank.html.
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Id.
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Id. Adam M. Kanzer, managing director and general counsel for New York-based
Domini Social Investments LLC, acknowledged that, “We’re in a globalized economy
where you can’t ignore things anymore.” Id.

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Towards Stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

concern that a national agency focused on US companies and the economy
is now in a position to influence complex international humanitarian issues.
D. The Act gives International Companies an Economic Advantage
One outcome of the Act is that it gives foreign companies an economic
advantage. Once the Act is implemented, US companies will either seek the
minerals from other regions or pay the costs incurred when adhering to the
reporting requirements.
If US companies purchase minerals elsewhere, the Act will fail to
achieve the legislative intent of curbing the crisis in the DRC. While US
companies buy elsewhere, foreign companies will take over the demand for
their portion of the minerals. Not only does this fail to positively impact the
situation in the DRC, but it also has the potential to negatively impact it
because the worst offenders in the exportation of conflict minerals, all
Asian companies, will likely buy a portion of the minerals previously
purchased by US companies.170
If US companies continue to use minerals subject to the Act, they will be
forced to bear the costs incurred to adhere to the Act while foreign
companies will not. While no concrete figures exist, various estimates show
that the costs will be substantial. The SEC’s analysis found that “after
analyzing the comments and taking into account additional data and
information, [they] believe it is likely that the initial cost of compliance is
approximately $3 billion to $4 billion, while the annual cost of ongoing
compliance will be between $207 million and $609 million.” 171 Those
within the affected industries insist that this estimate falls short of actual
costs. For example, IPC, Association Connecting Electronics Industries (a
170

For a rating of company diligence on avoiding conflict minerals, see Conflict Minerals
Company Ranking, RAISE HOPE FOR CONGO, http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/content/
conflict-minerals-company-rankings (last visited Feb. 27, 2013). At the bottom of the list
are companies such as Nintendo, HTC, Sharp, Nikon, and Canon. These companies are
not listed in the US, and therefore are not required to adhere to the legislation.
171
Conflict Minerals, supra note 1, at 56, 335.
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trade association in the electronics industry), calculated “median due
diligence burdens in excess of $65,000 (USD) per company in the first
year.” 172 IPC then added $170,000 for the “estimated costs for tracking
software, additional staff, training, legal expenses, and third party audits.”173
But it also estimated that for “printed circuit board (PCB) and electronic
manufacturing services (EMS) companies along with their suppliers, the
estimated cost impact of due diligence is estimated at roughly 279 million
dollars in the first year alone, with ongoing annual costs expected to be
around 165 million dollars.”174 The National Association of Manufacturers
also estimated the implementation costs for US industry, “asserting that it
will more likely be between $9-16 billion.”175
Part of the difficulty in estimating the likely cost is the unknown number
of companies which will fall under the scope of the legislation. Competitive
Enterprise Industries, a non-profit public policy organization that
specializes in regulatory issues, commented to the SEC that
While the Commission estimates the rules will apply to
approximately 6,000 companies, the actual number of companies
subjected to their repercussions is likely much higher. Lawrence
Heim of Elm Consulting Group International estimates at least
12,000 companies will be affected by the rules, reasoning that
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FERN ABRAMS, IPC- ASS’N CONNECTING ELECTRONIC INDUS. COMMENTS ON SEC
PROPOSED RULE ON CONFLICT MINERALS, 1 (Mar. 2, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010.shtml.
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supply chains, as well as the expenses of compiling a Conflict Minerals Report in the
event a company cannot verify the absence of conflict minerals in its products. These
reports require companies to detail their due diligence efforts with regard to their supply
chains, and must be vetted by an independent private-sector auditor. The burden on
businesses will be significant.
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many suppliers may not be directly subject to the rules but
nevertheless affected by the compliance efforts of issuers.176
But even without accurate figures, the fact remains that many companies
will be impacted at a substantial cost. Although there is no free solution to
attaining peace in the DRC, the high price to be paid by US companies
could not come at a worse time with the financial crisis. The costs of
abiding by the Act is only made more frustrating when one considers that
the humanitarian impact is likely to be minimal at best.
E. The Act Results in Unintended Mining Bans which Harm Civilians
The mining ban implemented by Kabila in 2010 left thousands of
Congolese involved in the mineral trade out of work, the repercussions of
which were felt by their families and their communities. However, Kabila
was not the only one to implement a ban as a result of the Act. Shortly after
the ban was lifted in March 2011 and Dodd-Frank was about to be
implemented, the Malaysia Smelting Company stopped accepting DRC
minerals after being put under pressure from a watchdog group, the
Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition. 177 Having bought up to 80
percent of its tin from the DRC, the MSC’s embargo was devastating to the
DRC civilians.178
The responses from Kabila and MSC emphasize the need for the US to
have a global understanding of the complex problem surrounding the
situation in the DRC. The legislation is not simply a US response that will
only affect US corporations—it affects the Congolese civilians,
international companies, and many countries connected to the DRC. Given
176
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Seay, supra note 7, at 14. “The EICC created a tracing scheme for smelters that
requires corporations to show their ores to be conflict free, and most companies were to
work through a tin industry group called ITRI to ensure their minerals were appropriately
tagged as being conflict-free. This tracing scheme went into effect on April 1, 2011.
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the response from Kabila and MSC, it appears that the US either did not
understand the likelihood of bans resulting from the Act or did not fully
comprehend how the bans would impact the DRC. The consequences of this
lack of foresight have been substantial.

VIII. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The Act has shown that the United States recognizes that it is not a
singular cell, but part of a large web where its actions impact remote areas
of the world. What the lawmakers failed to acknowledge, or did not care
enough to explore, is how complex that web is or how the Act will impact,
and has impacted, others.
The Act has oversimplified the situation in the DRC, with the proponents
believing that the requirements of the Act will reduce the illegitimate
mineral trade and thus reduce or extinguish the violence in the DRC. But as
has been shown throughout this article, the Act is unlikely to positively
affect the DRC. The ban will not stop the mineral trade—any US companies
that go elsewhere to purchase their minerals will simply be replaced with
foreign companies. Nor will the ban reduce the violence or address the
militias and rebels that control the region. Instead of focusing on the causes
of the violence, including land rights, lack of government, lack of economic
opportunity, and ethnic tension, the Act simplifies the crisis to be based
only on minerals. And as the Act fails to better the situation in the DRC, US
companies will struggle to adhere to complex and expensive reporting
requirements.
While this article has discussed a wide variety of considerations
connected to the Act and teased out the individual aspects of the legislation
that make it weak or ineffective, the general goal of this piece is to provide
law makers and the aid industry with an understanding of how legislation
aimed at bettering a situation can have negative and unintentional impacts.
Based on the complex situation in the DRC, I would argue that no US
legislation would effectively end, or even substantially curb, the violence in
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the region. The problem must be addressed in the DRC, with companies and
countries involved in the region either through trade or politics. But even if
the general idea behind the Act of US companies self-reporting would have
been effective, the final version would have failed to accomplish its goals
because the lobbyists’ efforts resulted in countless loopholes and weakening
of the original legislation.
This raises the question of what will work to stop the violence and end
the crisis. Although there is not one clear answer, those who thoroughly
understand the crisis and the implications of the proposed solutions of the
Act have a multitude of ideas.
A. Invest in Tracing the Mineral Process
Money should be invested to learn how the mineral trade works in its
entirety. As previously discussed, the minerals change hands many times
before leaving the DRC. Practically no records are kept, and it is nearly
impossible for the exporter to know where the minerals have come from or
who has handled them along the way because of the complex dynamic
between the government, rebels, and miners.
Lawmakers cannot fully and accurately understand the impact that any
legislation will have without a full understanding of the process. A tracking
method should be put in place to trace the routes that the minerals take. Two
options include tracking specific minerals or employing researchers along
the routes to record the minerals. While either option would face logistical
difficulties, including opposition by those illegally trading, it is necessary to
aid in a better understanding of the trade and create a more comprehensive
and impactful solution to the crisis.
B. Gain Better Insight into the Rebels
It is difficult to understand the rebel groups’ goals and motivations for
resorting to violence. While much of the violence is over land, minerals,
and power, there are other considerations that need to be explored.
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Villainizing the rebels and engaging in warfare is one option. But another is
to initiate dialogue in order to understand what they aim to achieve via their
violent means. An open and safe forum without risk of prosecution would
enable the rebels to express their demands. This would better allow the
DRC government and other aid industries and nations to understand the
motivation behind the violence and address the root problems.179
C. Confront Neighboring Countries
As discussed, the mineral trade involves neighboring countries to the
DRC. Because the governments of these countries finance the violence and
reap the monetary rewards of the trade, they must be considered in
developing a peace plan. While the initial goal would be to hold the
countries accountable for providing support, care must be taken not to
alienate the countries and push them to use military or violent means to
maintain their income. A possible solution would be to provide the
governments with some profits from the DRC so that they are not enticed to
support the militia. While still “exploitation,” the incentive would be a
short-term solution that could aid the peace efforts in the DRC.
D. Address Land and Ethnic Disputes
Given that much of the violence is conflict over land and ethnicity,
efforts must be made to solve the underlying disputes. A recent New York
Times article emphasized the impact of not addressing the ongoing land and
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Séverine Autesserre, The Only Way to Help Congo, N.Y. TIMES, June. 22,
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actions worldwide, even news reporting. Id.
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ethnic disputes, stating “[i]f the international community continues to
address the consequences of the violence in Congo rather than its most
important causes, it will only add to the death toll.” 180 Land and ethnic
disputes are complex issues with no simple solution and will therefore not
be discussed in depth here. But whatever peace initiatives are explored, the
land and ethnic disputes must be considered fundamental to the solution.181
E. Support Infrastructure and Education
Infrastructure,
including
roads,
water
lines,
electricity,
telecommunications, and educational programs have been long-term goals
of many aid organizations and should continue to be. Unlike short-term
forms of aid such as food and medicine, the development of infrastructure
and places of education create the foundation for long-term stability.
Education is extremely important in reducing poverty because it not only
provides people with knowledge, but it also results in increased income and
better health, which in turn fuels the economy. 182 One form of higher
education that would directly impact the mineral trade and the local
economy would be a program that teaches Congolese how to process the
minerals. While normally done in Asia, the processing of the minerals in the
DRC would keep more money in the local economy.
Similar to education, infrastructure reduces poverty. 183 Roads,
telecommunication networks, hospitals, drains, and other forms of
180

Id.
While there is much that could be said about the process and prospect of solving land
disputes, for purposes of this article, I raise it as one of many considerations that must be
explored to stop the violence.
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infrastructure “facilitate[] the basic functions of a society that are necessary
to transport resources and people, produce and trade goods, provide
essential services and ultimately reduce poverty.”184 With infrastructure in
place, people are less focused on their basic needs for survival and are better
able to contribute economically to society.185
The biggest problem faced when trying to create infrastructure and
education in the DRC is the continued violence. No area of the conflict
region is truly safe from rebels. This is evidenced by the fact that in
December 2012, the city of Goma, which is the base to most aid agencies,
was taken over by rebels.186 If Goma, with such a large aid presence, can be
“captured,” one can expect that all other areas are at risk.

IX. CONCLUSION
With the complexity of the crisis there must be a united and
comprehensive front. The short-term goal should be to form an international
coalition of individuals who can explore the crisis in the DRC and then
tease out the factors that must be considered in creating a sustainable
solution. Such a coalition must include DRC government officials, miners,
rebels, government officials of neighboring and benefitting countries, and
aid agencies and corporations involved in the mineral trade.
By including members of the DRC government, the coalition can ensure
that the government understands and supports the planned solution. The
government members can critically examine any proposals for how they can
be implemented through political means.
Other Congolese must also be present at the table. This includes artisanal
miners and traders, as well as members of rebel groups. While they may not
rtyproject.com/infobank/infrastructure (last visited Oct. 11, 2013).
184
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185
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be elected officials or highly educated, these groups do have extensive
knowledge of the crisis because they understand what happens on the
ground and what the goals and consequences of each action are. These
individuals will be able to realistically foresee how the peace process will
be accepted and the potential implementation issues when discussing the
proposals.
Neighboring governments should also be allowed to contribute to the
discussion. Countries such as Rwanda and Uganda have contributed to the
violence and also gain substantial rewards from the DRC mineral trade.
Therefore, they must be able to voice their interests and concerns to ensure
that they support the peace efforts, instead of working against them.
Other countries that reap the benefits of the crisis, specifically those in
Asia, Europe, and North America, must also contribute. It is important to
understand what peace initiatives these countries will support politically,
monetarily, and perhaps physically. A united front is necessary to ensure
that countries will not work against peace initiatives in efforts to obtain
cheap minerals.
Similar to foreign countries, the aid agencies need to have a voice. The
UN and many other agencies have a large presence in the DRC and engage
in many different initiatives. It is necessary to ensure that aid agencies are
working in support of the legislation and not unintentionally against it.
Lastly, corporations will need to be present. As this paper has discussed,
corporations rely heavily on the DRC for their products’ contents. If
corporations are not behind the efforts, they could potentially purchase
minerals supporting the conflict and hinder the DRC peace initiative.
Therefore, whatever policy implemented must have corporate support.
Attaining peace and stability in the DRC is far from hopeless—the
violence can be stopped. The Act reveals that the United States understands
that it plays a role in the crisis, yet the Act falls short of actually addressing
the root causes of the problem. A weak piece of legislation, full of
loopholes and designed by those unfamiliar with the crisis, is likely to have
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minimal (if any) success in stopping the violence. Moving forward, a
coalition of knowledgeable individuals from around the world must work
together to look at the actual causes of the violence and design a DRCbased initiative that can settle the disputes that continue to claim the lives of
thousands each month.
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APPENDIX A:

Source: Conflict Minerals, supra note 1, at 56, 283.
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